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TO AOB [1.4a]  
FROM ODA [1.4a]  
DTG- 311830CJAN07  
SUBJ- OPSUM [1.4a] NAJAF 28 - 29 JAN 07

AAA OPSUM FOR [1.4a] NAJAF 28 - 29 JAN 07

BBB WHO: ODA [1.4a] Three Companies (-) Hilla SWAT

CCC WHAT: Movement to Contact, React to Near Ambush, React to Downed Aircraft,  
Use CAS to Facilitate Ground Fire & Maneuver, Use CAS to destroy enemy in trenches  
and buildings

DDD WHERE: MGRS 38S MA 38 52

EEE WHEN: 281230CJAN07 – 291500CJAN07

FFF WHY: Support Hilla SWAT in responding to a regional security threat as requested  
by the Najaf Provincial Leadership

GGG SUMMARY (All grids are preceded by 38S MA):



PHASE 1: (PRE-MISSION): The Hilla SWAT CDR, [1.4a] met with the 18Z at 280800CJAN07 for PT and discussed a gathering of Al Mahdawayah (Arabic Proper Noun for which there is no translation) IVO Najaf. [1.4a] said the Najaf Governor requested him to bring SWAT in for reinforcements. The 18A & 18Z offered USSOF assistance if necessary, but [1.4a] only requested USSOF be on stand-by. The 18A & 18Z monitored ODA [1.4a] activity with the AOB CDR and heard they were in contact with AIF and using CAS to facilitate maneuver. Based on previous enemy contact IVO Najaf with ODA [1.4a] USSOF at Fire Base Stack presumed the firefight would end shortly. [1.4a] returned later requesting ODA [1.4a] leave immediately with two companies of Hilla SWAT to go to Najaf at the Najaf Governor's request. 18A attempted to dissuade [1.4a] from reacting hastily, but he was determined to go with or without USSOF support. 18A agreed to move with Hilla SWAT as a reinforcing

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effort and briefed the AOB CDR on the situation, requesting the AOB to inform ODA 1.4a of additional units entering the battlespace.

PHASE 2: (INFIL): At approx. 1130C, ODA 1.4a in one HMMWV and an up-armored 5-ton left with two companies of Hilla SWAT for Najaf, stopping at a gathering of IA, IP, and LN provincial leadership at 38S MA 351.4a 501.4a LNs on the ground b 6 b 6 - in charge of Najaf Province Security, IA Staff b 6 b 6 and various Provincial Council members) provided confusing and inaccurate reports of the situation, but all agreed that the AIF were Al Mahdawiyah. LNs also stated that the engagement began when AIF fired on an ISF patrol. 18A called ODA 1.4a on SAT at approx. 1230C to gain USSOF SA and was told that USSOF returned to Camp David after an engagement IVO 38S MA 351.4a 52.4a b 6 received reports that AIF stole three IA HMMWVs and were using them against ISF. IA (b)(6) denied this, but was unable to confirm or deny whether any of his vehicles were still IVO the AIF area. During this time, USSOF observed SAF and RPG fire at two AH-64 Apaches that were circling approx. 2 kms to the NE. After approx. 30 minutes on the ground USSOF and SWAT began a Movement To Contact IVO the area identified by ODA 1.4a with the understanding that all CF had left the area and the majority of AIF were killed earlier by USSOF and ISF.

#### PHASE 3: (EXECUTION):

Movement to Contact: 18Z cross-loaded 12 x SWAT onto the 5-ton before infilling directly east on the hardball road leading to a set of chicken coups at MGRS 38S MA 381.4a 52.4a Order of March was two SWAT trucks in the lead, the HMMWV, four SWAT trucks, the 5-ton, then the remaining SWAT trucks. The JTAC established comms with the Apaches as the ground force left ASR Miami. The ground force approached the chicken coup from the south and moved the HMMWV to the lead to enter the perimeter fence. SWAT and the HMMWV drove the inside perimeter to clear the area, giving visibility of the north side where an approx. six foot high berm 300 meters away ran east-west and another berm approx. 500 meters away ran north-south, boxing the area in to the north and east. The area between the chicken coup and the berm was open flat terrain with no cover. The lead HMMWV led the ground force east towards a break in the berm attempting to get out of a potential Engagement Area (EA). On approach the HMMWV gunner saw a suspicious lone HMMWV move south to north on a hardball road approx. 500 meters east, then multiple armed LNs, vehicles, and HMMWVs on the opposite side of the berm in defensive fighting positions. The break in the berm was actually a cliff manned by more armed LNs. b 3 b 6 realizing the potential to become quickly overwhelmed but not having enemy PID, fired the .50 cal into the berm to keep their heads down. The LNs held fire and hurriedly pointed to the north. Realizing that the ground force was boxed-in if AIF occupied and fired from the opposite side of the berm, the 18A directed the ground force to occupy the berm on the north and east of the chicken coup. ((USSOF later learned that the AOB, witnessing this unfold through an ISR feed, saw approx. 100 AIF on the opposite side of the berm.))

React to Ambush (MGRS 381.4a 1.4a): Simultaneously, but unbeknownst to the lead HMMWV, AIF dismounts on the opposite side of the north berm (approx. 100 m to the north) began to engage the ground force with SAF. The 18Z in the 5-ton yelled for the ground force to flank west towards the north berm. USSOF in the 5-ton saw the column of SWAT trucks and HMMWVs oriented west to east, all left turn in unison and move north online to the berm. b 3 b 6 maneuvered the lead HMMWV northwest, directly

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into heavy enemy fire from the berm, to place the HMMWV in a position to C2 the ground force on the berm. This placed the HMMWV with half of SWAT to the east, and half of SWAT and the 5-ton to the west. The AIF displaced north from the berm and occupied hasty fighting positions along the tree line approx. 50 - 75 m north of the berm and continued to engage the ground force. At this point the ground force effectively became split in half with the 5-ton and SWAT on the west pinned down by effective fire and the HMMWV and SWAT less than 100 m to the east under minimal fire and able to maneuver and return fire from the berm. Every time USSOF or SWAT on the west raised a head above the berm, incoming rounds sent dirt flying. SWAT received one WIA during this time and ground evacuated him to an Iraqi hospital. The JTAC requested the Apaches, who were focused on the gunfire in the village, move to the ground force location to conduct RW gun runs on the AIF fighting positions. The 5-ton gunner was the only individual on the west flank able to continually provide effective suppressive fire. The eastern flank identified a white Bongo and a blue Bongo with a heavy MG mounted in the bed, approx. 200 - 300 meters to the north behind another berm, to which the AIF were maneuvering. [b 3, b 6] engaged the blue Bongo with four 81 mm Carl Gustav (Carl G) rounds (2 x HE, 2 x HEDP), killing one and impacting the blue Bongo, while the HMMWV gunner engaged multiple dismounted targets. The 18A engaged multiple targets before directing SWAT to occupy the eastern berm and rear security to prevent an AIF flanking maneuver. The 18A and [b 3, b 6] then examined the eastern flank of the AIF and noticed a north-south running berm that potentially provided cover for a dismounted force to flank the AIF. At this point, approx. five minutes into the react to ambush, the JTAC reported that an Apache was shot down to the NW at MGRS 36[1.4]53[4] (just east of ASR Miami) by ground fire. The second Apache then focused on the downed Apache. Additional reports came in confirming that there were, in fact, three IA HMMWVs IVO a village to the NW that were stolen by the AIF. Not realizing the severity of the western flank's situation, the 18A directed a break in contact to move to the downed aircraft. The 18Z informed the 18A that this was not feasible due to the heavy volume of fire they were receiving, and recommended a flanking maneuver. The 18A acknowledged and instructed the SWAT CDR to assemble men for a dismounted assault with the 18A, JTAC, and [b 3, b 6]. The 18Z then recommended that the flanking element only establish a base of fire as opposed to assaulting west, do to limited ability to shift SWAT's fires in support of a moving element. [b 3, b 6] wisely recommended the HMMWV with gunner and driver move to support the western flank, where it assisted the 5-ton gunner in providing continual suppressive fire for the western flank. The 18A requested additional support from the AOB to secure the crash site. The 18A, incorrectly understanding from the JTAC that the two remaining fast-movers could be split between the 18Z and the 18A, requested that it happen to ensure both elements could receive CAS. Only later did it become apparent that the message was not understood due to multiple aircraft talking in the JTAC's ears at the time. Meanwhile on the western flank, the 18Z, [b 3, b 6] [b(3), (b)(6)] made repeated unsuccessful attempts to get SWAT to gain fire superiority from the berm. These USSOF continually gave commands and led by example, rising above the berm to engage the enemy and lead SWAT in establishing fire superiority. Except for one brief period they were simply unwilling to remain above the berm to return fire. USSOF noticed that most of the AIF were wearing black tops and bottoms with assault vests and magazine racks. [b 3, b 6] provided covering fire while [b 3, b 6] attempted to engage two AIF behind a tree at 200 m with the Carl G. [b 3, b 6] first attempt failed so he dropped back down behind the berm. [b 3, b 6] then received a gunshot wound to the head from an enemy round that impacted his MICH. [b 3, b 6] assessed and treated the wound before [b 3, b 6] returned to the fight. Despite

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receiving a gunshot wound to the head, leaving him significantly dazed, [b 3 b 6] returned to firing from the berm to motivate SWAT to return fire. [b 3 b 6] not realizing [b 3 b 6] was no longer covering him, rose back up to fire the Carl G and received a gunshot wound to the head from an enemy round that impacted his MICH. A SWAT medic pulled off [b(3), b(6)] MICH, assessed the wound and his consciousness, applied a dressing, and re-assured [b 3, b 6] that he was alright. The SWAT medic conducted follow-on checks with [b 3, b 6] later in the day. After treating two gunshot wounds to the head, [b 3 b 6] engaged dismounts in the open with the 81 mm Carl G HE round set for air burst at approx. 200 m. [b 3 b 6] realized the impact on SWAT if a USSOF Soldier was removed from the fight and fought to avoid collapse on several occasions. His efforts likely averted a complete collapse of SWAT's will to fight on the west flank. On the east flank, [b 6] continued assembling approx. 50 SWAT for the dismounted assault. [b 3 b 6] carried an AT-4 he took from the HMMWV before it joined the base of fire team on the west.

Company Attack: There was now a flanking element consisting of 50 SWAT dismounts led by [b 6] along with the 18A, JTAC, [b 3 b 6] and interpreter [b 6] and a base of fire element led by the 18Z and remaining USSOF and SWAT including two SWAT Company CDRs. The 18Z, with two USSOF injured and himself controlling the base of fire, directed [b 3 b 6] to focus on the truck FM and SATCOM to maintain comms with the flanking element and the AOB, ensuring crucial comms during the maneuver. [b 3 b 6] continued providing crew-served fire support while [b 3 b 6] continued motivating SWAT to return fire. The flanking element moved south around the eastern berm then back north, passing numerous ISF hunkered down in the low ground and stopped at another east-west running berm just forward of earlier one. At this point the flanking element noticed a road running east-west just in front of the berm, on which were multiple IP and civilian SUVs that were riddled with SAF. The road on the east running north-south was across approx. 50 m of open ground and the intersection had several other destroyed vehicles. This position provided better visibility of the eastern flank to which the element was maneuvering. Again, [b 3 b 6] and the 18A assessed the feasibility of moving north. AIF to the NW, seeing movement through the break in the berm, began firing on the flanking element, decreasing the rate of fire on the base of fire element. The 18Z was now able to get the base of fire to provide suppressive fire. By this time a second flight of Apaches was on station providing gun runs on AIF fighting positions IVO the two Bongo trucks. Using the base of fire and gun runs to suppress the AIF, the flanking element crossed the road and moved north along the berm approx. 100 m before being pinned down by SAF from the north. The JTAC identified the friendly position with a signal mirror and requested a GBU-12 approx. 100 meters to the north on the two Bongo trucks. The 18A told the flanking element to assault the enemy position as soon as the bomb landed. After impact the flanking element assaulted the enemy position, climbing an approx. eight foot berm to see down into the corner of a 10 foot deep trench line that ran west as far as the eye could see and north approx. 50 m until another berm blocked the view. On the opposite side another berm approx. 20 feet high from the bottom of the trench blocked all but the barrel of the Bongo mounted heavy MG. USSOF and SWAT, still receiving fire, engaged the survivors in the trench. [b(6)] while leading SWAT to the top of the berm and engaging the enemy, received a gunshot wound to the face requiring [b 3 b 6] to assess and pack the wound with Kerlix. This severely dissuaded SWAT from continuing to fire from the top of the berm. This was the first realization by the ground force of the magnitude of AIF defensive preparations. During this time the JTAC witnessed one AIF blow himself up approx. 150 m away in the trench.

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At this time the 18Z began requesting CAS on FM on multiple buildings used by AIF approx. 700 m to his NW. Realizing that the CAS allocation hadn't worked as planned, the 18A and JTAC began working to get them a CAS mission. The aircraft, unable to directly communicate with the 18Z, requested a grid as opposed to a distance and direction from the VS-17 panel marking the 5-ton at their position. After relaying the TGT grid, aircraft stated it was the friendly position of the VS-17 panel and requested a distance and direction from the VS-17 panel then delayed again to confirm that the 18Z had eyes on the TGT. USSOF confirmed that the original TGT grid was correct, but numerous grids passed in a short period of time created confusion for the pilots. At this time the confusion of numerous aircraft requiring air control assistance forced the JTAC to assume air traffic controller duties to arrange the aircraft. While this new development set in, HMMWVs approached from the north along the road, firing mini-guns and .50 cal into the berm just north of the flanking element. It was unclear at first whether they were friendly or the stolen HMMWVs. Believing they were friendly but fearing fratricide, the 18A moved to a position in the open and began waving both arms at the HMMWVs, which then pulled into position next to the dismounts to coordinate. The 18A identified himself as the Ground Force CDR (GFC) and coordinated efforts with three separate individuals (USN Seals and members of [1.4a] SFG(A)) who identified themselves as TF [1.4a] with the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Force (ICTF). The 18A sketched the L-shaped configuration the ground force was currently in for TF [1.4a] SA. TF [1.4a] stated they were there to secure the crash site, but didn't believe it was along ASR Miami on their infil from Camp David. The 18A and JTAC confirmed the grid and pointed TF [1.4a] to the west where the smoke from the crash had already dissipated. The ODA [1.4a] and TF [1.4a] JTACs coordinated to push RW CAS to TF [1.4a] and FW CAS to ODA [1.4a]. While coordinating, the combined element continued receiving SAF from the north, resulting in at least one wounded ICTF. TF [1.4a] agreed to exfil (b)(6) reiterating that their priority was the crash site. On request from TF [1.4a], the JTAC used Apaches to drop flares to mark the downed aircraft. TF [1.4a] recommended the flanking element return to the base of fire element, and then returned north then west on the hardball road to ASR Miami to find the crash site, firing mini-gun and .50 cal into the same berm just north of the flanking element. The flanking element, realizing the futility of further advances in light of the situation, began moving back south to re-link up with the base of fire and use CAS along with the new understanding of the battlefield to destroy remaining enemy positions. Meanwhile, the base of fire element began talking with the ODA [1.4a] 18A on SATCOM at the time of the GBU-12. The 18Z ensured that the ODA [1.4a] 18A would hold TF [1.4a] from their assault until ODA [1.4a] cleared their assault lane. Soon after that, the base of fire element received significant fire from a mini-gun and .50 cal to the north. TF [1.4a] at this time had turned onto a westward running road and presumably began firing south to cover their movement. The base of fire element, believing that TF [1.4a] assault south was underway, called for a cease-fire on SATCOM and FM to prevent fratricide. The 18Z and 18A coordinated over FM with their differing accounts of TF [1.4a] plan of action. Going with the worst case scenario that TF [1.4a] had changed plans and was assaulting south, made believable by the mini-gun fire the base of fire element received, the flanking element halted and moved into position to provide covering fire while the base of fire moved east out of TF [1.4a] way. Still receiving fire from the trench line, the JTAC requested Apache rockets and a second GBU-12 for the western bend in the trench where numerous AIF were seen fleeing away. This would clear AIF for TF [1.4a] prior to their presumed assault south, and support the base of fire's move east. Following the second GBU-12, the flanking element moved into the prone behind cover to provide suppressive fire. Continued SAF from the NW dissuaded most SWAT from moving into position, leaving

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USSOF and [b 6] with approx. 5 SWAT to support the base of fire's movement. By this time the 18Z had tried repeatedly with minimal success to convince SWAT to displace to the east, and requested that the flanking element rejoin him and remain behind cover during TF [1.4a] presumed assault. [b(6)] on the M240B repelled over 40 AIF who were cresting a berm to the north in an attempt to outflank the USSOF/SWAT maneuver element on the east. He later stopped the AIF resupply effort that was running back and forth from the village to the berm with ammo. [b 6] [b 6] use of the .50 cal and M79 prevented repeated AIF attempts to re-man the Bongo mounted DShK. The JTAC requested a third GBU-12 on the trench system to facilitate movement south across the road and behind the southernmost berm. While waiting on the third GBU-12, a lone HMMWV came within 100 m of the flanking element, moving north on the hardball road and eventually recovering a destroyed civilian SUV and leaving. With only small arms and one AT-4, the possibility of it being one of the AIF operated HMMWVs left the flanking element with the choice of bad or worse regarding which side of the berm to stay on. Following the third GBU-12 the flanking element moved south across the road, consolidated and accounted for all personnel, and unsuccessfully attempted an Apache gun run on the treeline 75 m north of the base of fire element before linking back up with them. Up to this point, [b(6)] and [b 6] on the crew-served weapons were crucial in providing suppressive fire in the absence of SWAT returning fire. Without their effective fire, the base of fire element would likely have been overrun by AIF up to 75 m to the north. On the final movement to link back up with the base of fire [b(6)] placed himself in the lead to prevent potential fratricide when the two elements rejoined. His actions during the flanking maneuver were commendable. As the only interpreter with the element, with only body armor and a helmet, he remained with the 18A in the lead; ensuring commands were understood by SWAT. Throughout the OPN he provided valuable recommendations on SWAT's morale. By 1630C ODA [1.4a] and SWAT were reconsolidating at the original position with various ineffective ISF still on the east side of the berm. AIF continued with sporadic volleys of fire preventing a true static overwatch position from the berm. [b 6] [b(6)] coordinated for his 4th Company to move in from ASR Miami and conduct link-up to reinforce. This period allowed USSOF to better examine the ground, and identified six bomb craters with freshly moved dirt and body parts in an area approx. 150 m wide stretching south from the 5-ton. USSOF counted two EKIA from the remaining body parts.

CAS OPNs and Relief in Place: By 1700C ODA [1.4a] recognized the superior tactical position held and used CAS to destroy remaining enemy. The 18Z informed the 18A that a Stryker BN was en route to conduct relief in place and conducted ammo redistribution. The HMMWV gunner had already begun conserving ammo after expending half (500 rnds) of the truck supply. The 5-ton gunner fired half the 5-ton's approx. 5600 rnd supply by link-up. The 5-ton's rear M240Bs hadn't been used at this point. The JTAC began coordinating with multiple air assets for fire missions while the 18A and [b(3), b(6)] attempted to contact TF [1.4a] to confirm their intent and location. ODA [1.4a] Base offered two A-10s that entered the battlespace. Soon after, TF [1.4a] requested additional CAS to support their position due to heavy incoming fire. The 18A instructed the JTAC to push the A-10s to TF [1.4a] and keep other FW CAS in support of ODA [1.4a]. Aircraft continued to identify targets to the north, but lack of SA on TF [1.4a] limited ability to clear CAS fires. After hearing that TF [1.4a] was recently at MGRS 37[1.4a]52[1.4a] the 18A cleared rockets preceding a JDAM on the trench to our north and a laser-guided bomb on an east-west running canal also to the north. After this, following lucrative CAS targets were too far west to safely clear fires without having real-

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time comms with TF [1.4a] This included gatherings of up to 40 AIF east of the village, around the captured HMMWVs. [b 3 b 6] mounted the 5-ton's rear M240B to engage and repel a white pick-up that attempted to flank from the west and a blue bongo approaching from the south on the chicken coupe road. The detachment attempted through multiple means to contact TF [1.4a] while also determining link-up procedures with the Stryker BN to whom ODA [1.4a] was now TACON. After dark the AC-130 came on station and comms with the Stryker BN (Patriot) provided sufficient SA to begin using the AC-130 for CAS. After Patriot's link-up with TF [1.4a] and ODA [1.4a] it was understood that half of TF [1.4a] and most of ODA [1.4a] exfiltrated to Camp Hotel with the rest remaining with Patriot. ODA [1.4a] used the AC-130 to engage 100 AIF in the woodline and 40 AIF in a separate woodline, followed by squinters from each engagement. Patriot [1.4a] then ordered a CAS cease-fire and instructed that as GFC all clearance of fires would be through him. Additionally, ODA [1.4a] should exfil to allow a Patriot pure OPN. The 18Z's experience was crucial here in prompting the 18A to explain the tactical situation from ODA [1.4a] position, rather than attempting to withdraw under fire. After the 18A provided Patriot [1.4a] with specific TGTs identified by ISR, a recommended EA, and ODA [1.4a] recommendations, Patriot [1.4a] approved CAS TGTs east of the 38 easting and south of the 52 northing and agreed to send a unit to relieve ODA [1.4a] in place. This ensured that the southeast corner of the AIF's stronghold was secured, effectively boxing them in from the west and south and allowing interdiction of squinters moving east across the hardball road. ISR identified a HMMWV with dismounts surrounding it in the prone within the approved EA. The A-10s were reluctant to engage it so the AC-130 fired first, followed by A-10 gun runs. Numerous CAS missions including F16s, A-10s, and AC-130 followed resulting in the winchester of Hammer [1.4a] replaced by Hammer [1.4a]. When Hammer [1.4a] was close to winchester the JTAC instructed them to mark TGTs for the A-10 until Hammer [1.4a] came on station. With Hammer [1.4a] only 10 minutes away the JTAC told Hammer [1.4a] to winchester. [b 6] [b 6] received a report of an Afghani insurgent in a mosque IVO MGRS 364a 44a which the 18A relayed to Patriot [1.4a]. Concurrently, ODA [1.4a] coordinated the night-time link-up with Blackhorse [1.4a] (a company from the 3-2 IN Strykers). After a link-up facilitated by FM comms and IR flashes, the Strykers found a mounted route into the area several hundred meters to the southeast and began integrating onto the berm. The 18A and 18Z coordinated with Blackhorse leadership to provide SA (specifically on the prepared defensive positions) and conduct battle-handover. The JTAC began working alongside the Blackhorse JTACs to conduct CAS missions. Blackhorse brought in a more than enough .50 cal and 7.62 link for resupply. Throughout the night the USSOF JTAC with Blackhorse [1.4a] s GFC winchestered Hammer [1.4a]. During this time Blackhorse [1.4a] and the 18A discussed options for securing the OBJ in the morning, assuming there would still be resistance.

Securing the OBJ: At daylight USSOF and SWAT engaged several more dismounts to the north. The 18A met with Blackhorse [1.4a] and Patriot [1.4a] prior to BMNT to discuss the plan for securing the OBJ. USSOF and SWAT would hold the current position while Blackhorse cordoned the south and west and began clearing to the north. USSOF observed four AIF flee east across the hardball road, then prompted Blackhorse to expedite securing the road to prevent further squinters. At this point it became clear that AIF were surrendering in large numbers and Blackhorse requested USSOF and SWAT move along the eastern hardball road and use loudspeakers to encourage surrender. After moving into position SWAT moved up to the berm to control the surrendering AIF, then began conducting battlefield recovery IAW TTPs. Due to the need to retain the scene for thorough SSE, USSOF directed SWAT to leave weapons and munitions in

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place. The remainder of the day consisted of securing the area and walking the ground to determine the extent of the positions. The 18A coordinated with Patriot 1.4a to begin moving the SSE team from Camp David to the OBJ. A vast number of weapons had Arabic writing on them reading (b)(6). Two PUCs told USSOF interpreters that they were called two days prior and told to come meet the (b)(6) there. ODAs 1.4a facilitated an excellent resupply of food, water, fuel, CI VIII, ammo, tools, and batteries brought directly to ODA 1.4a. OD 1.4a facilitated the link-up of the SSE team with Patriot and assumed responsibility for them, allowing ODA 1.4a and SWAT to prep for exfil.

PHASE 4: (EXFIL): After reorganizing supplies from ODAs 1.4a USSOF and SWAT exfiltrated on the same infil route back to ASR Miami. ISF along the way congratulated the ground force. Due to reports b 6 received of planned ambushes on the return route, the ground force turned east at Kifl and took a road along the Eurphrates north, then turned to enter Hilla from the west.

Notes:

1) The recommended EA from ODA 1.4a to Patriot 1.4a was the following grids: MGRS 38 4a 2 4a 3 7 4a 1 4a 3 1 4a 2 4a 3 1 4a 5 2 4a. This was based on known ground truth at the time. ODA 1.4a believed enemy positions likely extended further west and was undetermined to the north. With Patriot 1.4a constraints, the final EA for CAS was almost exactly the boundaries of the AIF's stronghold.

2) The following is a close approximation of ammunition expended during the operation.

TOTAL	524	2900	835	20	32	5 (3-HE/2HEDP)
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3) The estimation of EKIA from direct fire during the operation is 63.

4) The final count as of 311800CJAN07, showing CAS attacks through 290100CJAN07 shows 40 separate CAS attacks conducted by ODA 1.4a through the ODA JTAC. He continued controlling AC-130 fires for Blackhorse 1.4a as the GFC after 0100C.

HHH NUMBER OF DETAINEES WITH TAG NUMBERS ACCEPTED INTO U.S. OR ISF DETENTION FACILITIES AND THE NAME AND LOCATION OF THE DETENTION FACILITY: Four detainees turned over to the IA-run Detainee Holding Area IVO the AIF village. SWAT conducted tactical questioning prior to turnover. Preliminary SSE TM reports show up to 300 male detainees.

III NUMBER OF IZ PERSONNEL KILLED BY USSOF: DF - 62, AC-130 (from reporting as of 311800CJAN07) - 176, Other FW and RW - UNK, Preliminary SSE TM reports show up to 250.

JJJ NUMBER OF IZ PERSONNEL WOUNDED BY USSOF: DF - UNK, AC-130 (from reporting as of 311800CJAN07) - 50, Other FW and RW - UNK, Preliminary SSE TM reports show up to 250.

KKK NUMBER OF WEAPONS CAPTURED / DESTROYED: Preliminary SSE TM reports show 1000s of AK-47s, 100s of RPGs, 6 x DShKs, and massive amounts of

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
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ammunition. AC-130 reports as of 311800CJAN07 show eight vehicles and five buildings destroyed.

LLL NUMBER AND TYPE OF OTHER MATERIAL CAPTURED: The following equipment was found on the east side of the EA IVO the trenches: Equivalent in Iraqi dinar to 110 USD, one x GP340 Motorola radio SN: PMUE1440ABE with a strip of 100 mph tape on the bottom and "7 Cobra" written in Arabic, a small memo book with AIF task organization, two Iraqi ID cards, one ID card with English and Japanese print. Translations are provided at the below.

From the Notebook:

2<sup>nd</sup> Squad



(Squad Leader)  
(XO)  
(Driver)  
(RPG)

(BKC)

1st Iraqi ID Card:

b 6 (from: Babil / Musayab)  
(additional untranslated information)

2nd Iraqi ID Card:

b 6 (from: Thee Qarr /Al-Nasaryeah/ Al-BtaHa'a)  
(additional untranslated information)

Corporate ID Card:

Back side had the hand written name (b)(6)

MMM DETACHMENT STATUS (MEN, WEAPONS, EQUIPMENT): 100% on Sensitive Items. NMC Equipment Requiring Replacement: 2 x MICH, 1 x PVS-14 NVG swing-arm mount for the MICH, 1 x PEQ-2A (SN: 020389A), 3 x H&K 5.56 mm magazines, 2 x empty 60 mm mortar cans, 1 x Hellfire Power Cable, 1 x Helmet Cam Replacement Hard Drive, 1 x AV 2055-3 UHF Antenna SN: 0607.

NNN SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE TRIGGERED THE OPERATION (I.E. CJSOTF-AP OR CF HUMINT, CJSOTF-AP OR CF 1.4c, CJSOTF-AP INTEL FUSION CELL OR CF INTEL FUSION CELL, ETC.): USSOF 1.4c previously reported the Al Mahdawayah splinter of the MM focused in Al Kawam (MGRS 39 82). This OPN was precipitated by ODA 1.4a/ TF 1.4a engagements earlier the morning of 28 Jan 07 in the same area.

OOO COMMANDER COMMENTS:

1) (b)(6) led from the front and was situationally aware throughout the OPN, staying in contact with Iraqi leadership who called with updates. However, aside from he

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and (b)(6) SWAT's performance under fire was sub-standard. Despite live-fire maneuver training we've conducted with them where the officers trumpeted that they're mostly former IA and know how fire and maneuver, they were largely ineffective in returning effective fire. The conceivable fix is tougher, more realistic training to equip them with the confidence necessary to react under fire. This requires significant training ammunition.

2) GOI reporting is contrary to LN reporting on the ground regarding the AIF. ODA 1.4a had recently targeted Mahdawayah in Kawam and b 6 was quite aware of their presence, stating they were a split from the MM. The return of the Mehdi is a belief limited to Shi'a, not Sunni. The significant prepared defensive preparations combined with the few detainees questioned who stated they'd just arrived begs a question.

3) ODA 1.4a performed admirably under fire. The synergy of experience, leadership, technical competence, and tactical understanding allowed the ODA and majority of SWAT to hold what turned out to be key terrain on the SE corner of the EA, gain outstanding SA, and influence the outcome of the battle.

4) The combined SA of 3-2 IN (Patriot) and ODA 1.4a resulted in a near perfect read of the enemy defensive positions, including their final defensive line in the trench. Patriot 4a wisely requested specific targets, locations, and descriptions before accepting that ODA 1.4a had accurate SA and was in key terrain that required holding.

5) b 6 seeing the lack of positive post-OPN spin for SWAT, is now taking a much greater interest in SWAT's current and long-term IO campaign. Though not yet specifically addressed, he realizes SWAT's performance under fire was sub-par. Additionally, post-OPN atmospherics indicate that several SWAT/OD 1.4a M TGTs in southern Babil are losing their fear-induced popular support as a result of the destruction of the Mahdawayah. The next several weeks will prove whether this is fluff or fact.

(b)(3), (b)(6) SENDS

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